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An “undesirable trading situation”
Ceri Warnock, the University of Otago
looks at the powers of the Electricity Authority
F
or the first time since government regulation of the
electricity market began, the regulator has intervened
in the wholesale market for electricity, declared the
existence of an ‘Undesirable Trading Situation’ and adjusted
down final trading prices. In Re Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd
[2012] NZHC 238 (BC201260350), the High Court rejected
appeals against that decision. The Court found that the
Electricity Authority had not committed any errors of law
and upheld the reset prices.
The case follows on from the events of “Big Saturday”.
On 26 March 2011, following planned maintenance work to
the national transmission grid, Genesis Power Ltd found
itself to be “net-pivotal” ie, it cornered the market for
electricity generation in and north of Hamilton. A generator
will be “net pivotal” when it can generate electricity to cover
existing supply commitments, and is also able and required
to supply additional demand in the market. Because demand
could only be fully met by supply from Genesis during the
outage, Genesis set the price of electricity on the spot market
for that period (for a full explanation see [35–61]). Genesis
operates the largest power generator in the country, Huntly,
based 70km from Auckland, and there was never any sug-
gestion that supply could not meet demand for the period of
the transmission outage. Nevertheless, the State-owned Enter-
prise offered spot prices to the wholesale market in excess of
$20,000 per MWh for a trading period of seven hours.
Trades close out on average at between $50 and $150 per
MWh. At the inflated price, it was estimated that Genesis
would take in the region of $45–50 million. Following “Big
Saturday”, thirty-five companies, including other genera-
tors, retailers and direct consumers of electricity complained
to the Electricity Authority.
REGULATORY POWERS
The Electricity Authority is empowered to investigate and
enforce compliance with the Electricity Industry Participa-
tion Code 2010: the Code that regulates the actions of all
industry participants. Specifically, the Authority is empow-
ered to investigate allegations that an ‘Undesirable Trading
Situation’ (“UTS”) has occurred. If the Authority finds that
an UTS has developed, it has wide discretionary powers to
rectify the situation, including deferring completion of trades
for a specified period and directing that any trades be closed
out or settled at a price specified by the Authority (Electricity
Industry Participation Code 2010 cl 5.2(2)(b), (c)).
An UTS is defined in cl 1.1 of the Code as:
any contingency or event—
(a) that threatens, or may threaten, trading on the
wholesale market for electricity and that would, or
would be likely to, preclude the maintenance of
orderly trading or proper settlement of trades; and
(b) that, in the reasonable opinion of the Authority,
cannot satisfactorily be resolved by any other mecha-
nism available under this Code; and
(c) includes, without limitation—
(i) manipulative or attempted manipulative trad-
ing activity;
(ii) conduct in relation to trading that is mislead-
ing or deceptive, or is likely to mislead or
deceive;
(iii) unwarranted speculation or an undesirable
practice;
(iv) material breach of any law; and
(v) any exceptional or unforeseen circumstance
that is at variance with, or that threatens or
may threaten, generally accepted principles of
trading or the public interest.
The Authority interpreted this as requiring paras (a) and (b)
to be met for a finding of an UTS, but regarded para (c) as
merely providing non-exhaustive examples of situations that
might constitute an UTS if (a) and (b) were also met. The
High Court accepted this interpretation as correct. To that
extent it was not necessary to find, for example, that Genesis
had been involved in manipulative trading ((c)(i)) for an UTS
declaration to be made. The implications of this are interest-
ing because it confirms that culpability is not an issue. The
focus of an UTS is not on penalising poor behaviour but
rather on ensuring the smooth-running of the market. This
interpretation affords maximum discretion to the Electricity
Authority; in determining whether to declare an UTS, the
Authority’s discretion is not fettered by having to consider,
for example, mal-intent on the part of the generator.
“Orderly trading”
The case is complex, the grounds of appeal were many and
varied and it is not possible in a brief article to address all the
issues. But one critical question in the case turned on the
meaning of cl 1.1(a) referring to “orderly trading”.
The appellants argued that the proper interpretation of
cl 1.1(a) required a focus on technical trades; it “requires the
likelihood that ongoing organised trading will stop as a result
of the “event” which is said to be the UTS” (at [94]). On the
facts, there was no categorical evidence to show that the
event had precluded “the proper settlement of trades”. But as
Ronald Young J observed, this was partly because the issue as
to whether trades would be completed at the high price was
never tested because intervention took place early (at [280]).
In relation to the first part of cl 1.1(a) the Electricity Author-
ity found that the events of 26 March “may” have threatened
trading and at least one company averred that it would have
been unable to complete trades at the Genesis offer price
(Electricity Authority “Final Decision on the Undesirable
Trading Situation of 26 March 2011”, 4 July 2011, at [52(f)]).
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The approach of both the Authority and the High Court
however suggested that they interpreted the latter part of
cl 1.1(a) as containing alternate, albeit complementary con-
cepts. The Electricity Authority rested its decision on the part
of cl 1.1(a) concerned with an event that “would be likely, to
preclude the maintenance of orderly trading”. The Authority
considered that its statutory objective, “to promote compe-
tition in, reliable supply by, and the efficient operation of the
electricity industry for the long term benefit of consumers”
(Electricity Industry Act 2010, s 15) provided an economic
context for the interpretative process, a rational for the UTS
provisions in the Code and justified the adoption of a wide
interpretation of “orderly trading”. To this extent, the Author-
ity equated “orderly trading” with the wider concept of
“orderly markets”rather than the more discreet focus of
“orderly trades”.Thiswider interpretation,onceagain, increases
the discretion available to the Electricity Authority.
A threat to orderly trading?
To determine whether there had been a threat to orderly
trading, the Authority considered three consecutive ques-
tions. The first was whether Genesis had been in a position to
determine prices in a significant portion of the wholesale
market during the relevant period. The answer was yes. The
second was whether exposed parties had had time to seek
supply from other sources or curtail their demand. For
various reasons the Authority accepted that such prices were
neither foreseen nor foreseeable by “diligent market partici-
pants”, and purchasers had been unable to avoid taking
supply from Genesis. The foreseeability or otherwise of the
“event” became a critical part of the argument before the
High Court but Ronald Young J declined to find an error of
law in the Authority’s approach (at [173]–[189].)
The third issue was whether those prices had been likely to
undermine the wholesale market to such an extent that an
UTS transpired? The Authority answered this in the affirma-
tive and focused, critically, not on the high prices per se but
rather on the fact that the prices did not reflect “an underly-
ing supply-demand imbalance” nor did they bear any “resem-
blance to any underlying or unavoidable cost”. The prices
did not reflect the proper workings of market forces; on the
contrary, they indicated that the market was not working
correctly. The Authority found that:
It is in the public interest to have an electricity market in
which all participants can be confident prices are competi-
tively determined. If participants observe that prices are
greatly divorced from supply-demand conditions and are
excessively higher than underlying costs, they will lose
confidence in the integrity of the market arrangements
and the incentive structures surrounding the wholesale
market for electricity may be greatly damaged.
These were not, therefore, “legitimate” high prices (at [260]).
The ramifications of allowing the prices to stand, the Author-
ity found, would be significant: there would be a precedent
effect for other generators that found themselves to be net
pivotal to abuse their transient market power; as there was
no permanent price cap in the market (in comparison to, for
example, the Australian market, see [267]) there would be no
limit on future spot prices offered; demand-side participants
would withdraw from the wholesale market; and “highly
inefficient investment signals” would be created and excess
additional generation would be installed. This would be the
very antithesis to an “orderly market”.
The appellants argued that the Authority was misguided
in adopting such a broad contextual analysis; rather the
focus should have been on the words used in the Code, refers
to “orderly trading” not “markets”. The High Court rejected
the appellants’ arguments and deferred to the expertise of the
Authority stating “[w]hat is “orderly” in this context the
Authority are uniquely qualified to assess” (at [97–99], [219]).
That may be correct (see below) and the reforms of electricity
regulation following the dissolution of the Electricity Com-
mission, the enactment of the Electricity Industry Act and the
creation of the Authority certainly placed even greater empha-
sis on the market-based expertise of the regulator (compare
for example the purpose of the Electricity Commission in
ss 172N–0 of the 1992 Act with the objectives of the Author-
ity in ss 15–16 of the 2010 Act) but it is a legal question as to
whether cl 1.1(a) is concerned solely with the completion of
trades or whether the word “trading” is synonymous with
the wider concept of the market, as an entire structure, with
a specified purpose.
Wide interpretation justified?
There are a number of reasons to support the Authority’s
interpretation of cl 1.1(a) as containing both a narrow and a
wide focus. This latter interpretation was open to the Author-
ity on the drafting of cl 1.1(a): it is an acceptable approach to
the grammatical construction and, if not read as containing
twoalternative concepts, the clausewouldbe tautological and
one or other part rendered otiose. But more importantly, if the
clausewere interpretednarrowlyas“requiring the stoppingof
trades” then the electricity market regulator would, in con-
trast to other market regulators, be deprived of a significant
weapon inensuring the timely restorationoforderlymarkets.
Most market-regulation has a similar purpose: to ensure
that markets are fair and orderly. For example, in terms of
financial market-regulation, the Financial Markets Author-
ity has the purpose of promoting “fair, orderly and transpar-
ent markets” (Securities Market Act 1988, s 36FC(2)(a)); the
Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom is con-
cerned with maintaining public “confidence” in the financial
markets (Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) s 2);
and legislation in the United States, regulating the financial
markets, is littered with reference to the public interest of
ensuring “open, fair and orderly markets” (Securities Exchange
Act 1934, s 12(f)(2); Securities Exchange Act 1933; Securi-
ties Exchange Act 1934, s 2). The regulation of the electricity
market accords with such philosophies.
Financial theory recognises an orderly market as one that
provides for the three market efficiencies: operational effi-
ciency, allocative efficiency and pricing efficiency. In other
words it ensures that prices are accurately set by the forces of
supply and demand (Arnold Corporate Financial Manage-
ment 3rd ed. (2005, Financial Times / Prentice Hall) 401;
although note that the concept of “orderly markets” is
criticized for indeterminacy by Bradley “Disorderly Con-
duct: Day Traders and the Ideology of “Fair and Orderly
Markets” (2000) 26 Iowa J of Corp L 63.)
To ensure the maintenance of an orderly market, it is not
uncommon for regulators to have ex ante mechanisms at
their disposal, for example the ability to halt all trading for a
period or to suspend certain actors or activities from the
market. Halts are often used to ensure the proper dissemina-
tion of information so as to promote pricing efficiency, but
may, depending on the specific market rules, be used in a
more discretionary fashion to pre-empt market disorder.
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Seligson v New York Produce Exchange 378 F Supp 1076
(1974) concerned one strand of litigation in a salad oil-
swindle. A case was brought against the market regulator for
not suspending all trading when a trader managed to acquire
over 90 per cent of the futures contracts in the market. The
Court stated that “[a] concentration in the long term interest
like that achieved by Allied is fraught with potential danger
to the market, inasmuch as it reduces liquidity, lessens price
stability, heightens the risk of a disorderly liquidation of
contracts should the demand curve faced by the party hold-
ing the interest shift, and in general threatens the mainte-
nance of an orderly market”. The Court accepted a cause of
action existed against the Exchange for negligent failure to
regulate and found there to be a prima facie case for a timely
halt to trading before market disorder ensued.
But the electricity market differs critically from other mar-
kets. Electricity cannot be stored (in any economical way) and
supplyanddemandmustbe inconstantbalance.Purchasers in
the wholesale market cannot refuse to take the electricity
offered, even at an inflated price, otherwise there would be
“black outs”. Aside from the economic damage, “black outs”
can pose a risk to human life. The market regulator does not
thereforehave thepower, common inothermarkets, tohalt all
trading and suspend the market before the market gets into
difficulties. The remedies open to the Authority are, rather, ex
post facto. The UTS is an ex post facto mechanism to help
restore order to the market. Thus, whilst the Authority cannot
call a halt to trading to prevent disorder, it would argue that it
should be able to take action as soon as practically possible to
restore order to the market. The focus on the need for timely
prevention is reinforced by the wording in cl 5.5 of the Code:
theAuthoritymust“attempttocorrecteveryundesirable trad-
ing situation and, consistently with s 15 of the Act, restore the
operationof thewholesalemarket as soonaspossible”.
Critics of the Authority’s intervention in the present case
might pose the question “at what point should the Authority
intervene?” or more specifically, “when does a high price
become too high and hence illegitimate?” and this is perhaps
the crux of the argument as to the interpretation of cl 1.1(a).
The appellants would contend that the market itself must
answer this question, ie, it is when trades cannot be com-
pleted because purchasers are unable or unwilling to pay
those high prices. This can be the only true measure of
“illegitimacy”. But, the Authority would no doubt argue that
this approach would be an incentive to disorder. If the court
were to accept the interpretation of cl 1.1(a) urged by the
appellants, the onus would be placed upon purchasers to
create the conditions for an UTS declaration by refusing to
complete trades and breaching their contractual obligations.
In the event of such default, various actions would be trig-
gered and greater disorder would ensue: the clearing man-
ager would become involved in an investigation under the
default provisions of the Code (cl 14.55–14.63), civil litiga-
tion may commence, generators may refuse to continue to
supply defaulters who in turn could not fulfil their obliga-
tions to customers. To limit intervention only to scenarios
where trades had or were about to fail would leave one of the
most critical and potentially volatile markets without suffi-
cient or timely preventative protection; it may exacerbate
disorder and, absent the high-water mark of failed trades, it
would not protect the long term health of the market from
the more insidious effects of asymmetries. “When do prices
become illegitimate?” the Authority would say is a question
that it must answer and it is at this point that the specialist
expertise of the Authority becomes particularly relevant.
Whilst the Authority was cognizant of the general undesir-
ability of ex post facto intervention with markets and the
uncertainty this may create, it opined that, “the market
would understand the intervention was specific to the cir-
cumstances of 26 March” (at [303]). To this extent, the
Authority did not believe its decision would act to deter
supply-side participants in the market, and the High Court
found no error of law in this approach (at [304]).
Following the events of “Big Saturday”, the Authority has
made several changes to the Code, for example demand side
bidding and forecasting has been introduced (Part 13). How-
ever, whilst such mechanisms may help to minimise the pros-
pects of similar events re-occurring, they offer no guarantee
and the application (or threat) of the UTS provisions will
continue tobean important regulatory tool.
THEAUTHORITY’SDISCRETION
In giving the Sixth Sir David Williams lecture to Cambridge
University in 2006, Lord Bingham recalled the dangers inher-
entwithbroaddiscretionarypowers:
The broader and more loosely-textured a discretion is,
whether conferred on an official or a judge, the greater the
scope for subjectivity and hence for arbitrariness, which is
the antithesis of the rule of law (Bingham “The Rule of
Law” (2007) 66 CLJ 67 at 72.)
The effect of Re Bay of Plenty Energy is to confirm, or confer,
the maximum discretion for the Authority to determine
whether there was an UTS. The Authority can intervene in
the electricity market to, in effect, put a ceiling on prices in
extraordinary circumstances, but there is no real certainty as
to what those circumstances might be.
Itperhapspays torecall thestatusandgeneralpowersof the
Authority. The Authority is an independent Crown entity. It is
neither democratically elected nor a judicial body. It has the
responsibilityofadministering,draftingandapprovingamend-
ments to the Code. But the Code, because of the manner of its
making (and note that it has its genesis in the multilateral
industry contracts that once regulated the industry) does not
meet the standards of finished parliamentary draftsmanship.
TheHighCourt comments inparticular that the“definitionof
a UTS is not without its difficulties” (at [130]) and this may in
part flow from the drafting process. The Authority has the
power to make legally binding decisions against industry par-
ticipantsonthebasisof theCodebut therulesofnatural justice
donotapplytoitsdecision-making(seeforexampleElectricity
Authority “Guidelines for Participants on Undesirable Trad-
ing Situation Version 2.1” 1 November 2010, at [18]–[21]). In
essence, the Authority regulates an industry that is of critical
importance to all New Zealanders and its decisions can have
massive financial ramifications as is aptly illustrated in the
present case.
There is a sense that although justice appears to have been
done on the facts of the case, this was achieved if not by
accident, certainly not by regulatory design. The UTS provi-
sion is poorly drafted and fails to set out a clear framework for
decision-making. This case will be appealed and it is to be
hoped that the Court of Appeal gives some guidance as to how
the extremely broad, discretionary powers of the Authority to
declare an UTS might be clarified, perhaps by recommending
that this critical provision be reconsidered and re-drafted with
greater clarity. r
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